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S.: Declaratory Judgments--Adjudication of Custody
CASE COMMENTS
When D answered "no", could he not have as easily inferred
that the supposition was false as that it was true, and would not
such construction go to the establishment of his innocence rather
than his guilt? Upon a full reading of the immunity statute, it is
easy to interpret it as requiring the testimony to be criminating
before immunity is granted for the offense to which the testimony
relates; yet, an opposite interpretation (that the testimony given
need not be self-incriminating in order to obtain immunity) may
be fairly arrived at, and it is this one which seemingly must be
given in order that the statute may have the breadth of W. VA.
CONST. Art. 3, § 5 ("nor shall any person, in any criminal case,
be compelled to be a witness against himself."). The privilege of
the constitution is to refuse to answer at all if the question may be
answered with an incriminating response. The two possible interpretations of the statute were not discussed by the court, but the
latter one was assumed though there are dicta in State v. Sterne,
96 W. Va. 360, 363, 123 S.E. 235, 237 (1924), to the effect that D
must give testimony which tends in some way to incriminate himself in order to be entitled to immunity.
Lastly, assume that D impliedly testified that the supposition
(engaging in illegal activities) was true, then is he not immune
from prosecution for any illegal activity carried on in his business
establishment? It would seem so, for the "offense in regard to which
he is so compelled to testify" is not one but all for which he might
seek protection through bribery. Thus, need any particular type
of criminal conduct be mentioned in the supposition, as the dissent
contends, before there can be immunity as to the assumption about
which there has been testimony?
This case may illustrate the proposition that a difficult case
makes bad law. The law of the case, whether good or bad, is
difficult to ascertain. This may have resulted from an inadequate
analysis of the questions propounded to D.
C. R. M.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-ADJUDICATION

OF CUSTODY.-P,

ex-

husband, instituted a proceeding under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 13, § 1, et seq. (Michie, 1949),
to adjudicate rights as to the custody of his minor children then
residing in Minnesota with D, his ex-wife, upon whom service of
process was had by delivery of a copy thereof to her in Minnesota.
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Held, that this is a proceeding in personam, and that service of
process outside the state on nonresident D is insufficient to give the
court jurisdiction over the person of D. Smith v. Smith, 83 S.E.2d
923 (W. Va. 1954).
Although the use of a declaratory judgment proceeding to adjudicate custody would afford a new and heretofore untried remedy
in West Virginia to determine custody, no question was raised by
the defendant, nor any comment made by the court, as to the
propriety of such a proceeding.
The proposition that the question of proper custory of children
may be determined in a declaratory action as well as a habeas
corpus proceeding or other traditional action at law or suit in
equity [1 ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 413

2d ed. 1951] has been presented in three other cases. In Carter v.
Nance, 304 Ky. 256, 200 S.W.2d 457 (1947), it was held that a
declaratory judgment action would lie to determine whether the
surviving father or maternal grandparents were entitled to the
custody of the father's minor child. This is apparently the only
case in the United States directly holding that the action would lie.
In Johnson v. Cook, 274 Ky. 841, 120 S.W.2d 675 (1938), the surviving mother brought an "action in the nature of a declaratory
judgment proceeding" against the paternal grandmother to determine the right to the custody of her infant son, and here as in the
instant case, the propriety of the declaratory action was not put
in issue. In Hope v. Hope, 4 De G.M. & G. 328, 43 Eng. Rep. 534
(1854), the wife had a divorce suit pending in England. While
sojourning in France, the French court gave her temporary custody
of the children pending final disposition of the divorce case by the
English court. Subsequently in a declaratory proceeding in England by the husband, the court made a declaration to the effect
that under English law the husband was entitled to custody of the
children until the matter was determined by the ecclesiastical court
in the divorce proceedings.
W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 18, § 1 (Michie, 1949), provides that
the courts "shall have power to declare rights, status and other
legal relations. . .

.;

and such declarations shall have the force

and effect of a final judgment or decree." Although the act does
not in express terms require the existence of a justiciable controversy, nevertheless, such controversy must exist and be susceptible
of judicial determination.

Town of South Charleston v. Board of

Education, 132 W. Va. 77, 50 S.E.2d 880 (1948); Dolan v. Hardman,
126 W. Va. 480, 29 S.E.2d 8 (1944); Joseph v. National Bank of
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W. Va, 124 W. Va. 500, 21 S.E.2d 141 (1942). On the basis of the
statutory authority and these cases, it would appear as a general
proposition that a declaratory judgment action would lie to
adjudicate custody.
However, the case under comment brings into consideration
a relevant factor which was not present in Carter v. Nance, supra,
Johnson v. Cook, supra, and Hope v. Hope, supra, that is, there
were prior final adjudications of custody. See Smith v. Smith, 76
S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 195p), in which case the court denied P a
divorce, but awarded hirt custody of the minor,children. Pending
final judgment in that action, the wife secured a divorce in Minnesota, and in that proceedihg she was awarded the custody of the same
minor children. See the instant case at 925.
In the principal case the purpose of the declaratory proceedings was to have "the rights of the parties as to custody of the
children determined," and no question as to the validity of the
Minnesota divorce decree was involved. Thus, the action on its
face was not to test the validity of the Minnesota decree, but to
determine an issue which had previously been adjudicated. At
first blush it would appear that an actual controversy did exist,
since distinct judicial proceedings resulted in each adverse party
being awarded custody; but it has been held that questions previously adjudicated are not the subject of an "actual controversy"
within the Declaratory Judgment Act. Shearer v. Backer, 207 Ky.
455, 269 S.W. 543 (1925). The purpose of the act is to have a
declaration of rights not theretofore determined, and not to determine whether rights, theretofore adjudicated, had been properly
adjudicated. Further, an action will not lie under the Declaratory
Judgment Act to determine the propriety of a judgment in a prior
action between the same parties. Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380,
80 S.E.2d 280 (1954); Ferree v. Ferree, 273 Ky. 238, 115 S.W.2d
1055 (1938). See Glassford v. Glassford, 76 Ariz. 228, 262 P.2d 386
(1953), holding that the Declaratory Judgment statute does not
contemplate a declaration on one's status or rights under a decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction.
A further limitation is placed on the use of a declaratory action
by W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 13, § 6 ( Michie, 1949), wherein it is
provided that the "court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered
or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy
giving rise to the proceedings." See Tharp v. Tharp, 131 W. Va.
529, 48 S.E.2d 793 (1948). The ensuing result of this provision is
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that the court will refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment
or decree when such judgment, if rendered, would not terminate
the controversy, remove the uncertainty giving rise to the proceeding, or serve any useful purpose. Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla.
782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641
(1954); Jackson, A Note on Declaratory Judgment Pleading and
Practice, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 135 (1942). In Pantelides v. Pantelides,
54 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1945), it was held that the use of a declaratory
judgment, although discretionary, is dependent on circumstances
rendering it useful and necessary, and in absence of necessity for
resort thereto, it should not be employed; nor should it be used
where a full and adequate remedy is alreadr provided by another
well known form of action. Brindley v. Mdara, 209 Ind. 144, 198
N.E. 301 (1935); James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 176
N.E. 401 (1931). See Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N.Y. 1, 188 N.E.
137 (1933).
Therefore, the general proposition that a "declaratory judgment action will lie to adjudicate custody" is qualified when such
proceeding is based on a factual situation equivalent to that found
in the principal case, due to the absence of an "actual controversy"
within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the
action would serve no useful purpose inasmuch as a declaratory
judgment decree would not be entitled to any higher degree of
full faith and credit in the Minnesota courts than the original
custory award in Smith v. Smith, 76 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1953).

M. J. S.

DEEDs-ESTOPPEL BY DE D-EFFECT OF REFERENCE.-Father of
P was seised of a one-half undivided interest in tracts of land No. I
and 2, and mother of P was seised of the other one-half undivided
interest in tracts No. 1 and 2, and of the whole of tract No. 3. By
deed the father and mother conveyed to P the father's "undivided
interest" in the three tracts (the father's only apparent interest in
tract No. 3 being his inchoate dower right). By a later deed P
conveyed to D with covenants of general warranty, "all those certain tracts [ 1, 2, and 3] . . . of surface land situate on Peter Cave
and Bartram Fork Creek of Little Lynn Creek ... and being the
same land conveyed by Sarah B. Wellman [mother] and B. F.
Wellman [father], her husband . .. and bounded and described
as follows . . . ." There followed metes and bounds descriptions
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